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Abstract— This paper presents possibility of using of the DNS 
(Domain Name System) protocol for creating a simplex 
communication channel between a malware-infected computer 
with a compromised DNS server. The proposed channel can be 
used to steal data or confidential enterprise information secretly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ETWORK steganography is the family of methods that 
uses telecommunications protocols as carriers for hidden 
data. These techniques utilise modifications of the packets to 
perform covert communication by modification to the structure 
of the packet (a payload and protocol specific fields) or 
modification to time relations among packets (like changing 
the sequence of the packets or inter-packet delays). Due to the 
fact that the DNS protocol (Domain Name System) is 
commonly used in the Internet, it is a prime candidate for a 
carrier [5]. The arguments speaking in favour of it include, 
among others, a great volume of standard packets and 
considerable problems with network operation when an 
administrator applies too stringent rules of traffic filtering to 
this protocol.  
With respect to the above, various attempts have been made 
to use the DNS for purposes other than originally intended. In 
2011 Symantec announced the discovery of the W32.Morto 
bug, which used vulnerability in RDP (Remote Desktop 
Protocol). For communication with the C&C channel 
(Command and Control) it uses TXT records in the DNS, 
which are dedicated to storing content understandable to a 
human. W32.Morto sends a query to the DNS server about a 
TXT record, instead of a typical “IP domain” demand. Next, 
the returned text is decrypted and processed. In this manner, an 
electronic signature of the file and an IP address are usually 
provided, from which an even more malicious malware is 
downloaded [3]. 
Another idea for use is channelling between the client’s 
machine and a substituted server, which is designated to 
provide a response for a previously crafted domain. Thus, it is 
possible to obtain access to the Internet even in a situation, 
when the only machine from a local network authorized to do 
so is a local DNS server. As demonstrated by the research [4], 
a channel obtained in this manner may reach the bit rate of as 
much as 1 Mbit/s, with delays of 150 ms. In this case, initial 
fragments of the URL address (Uniform Resource Locator) of 
the query are used for communication.  
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A popular idea in network steganography is to use fields of 
the packet’s header. For the protocol in question, this may be 
an ID identifying the demand and an answer related to it. Lack 
of appropriate distribution of values of this field turns out to be 
a problem, when the field is used to carry an encrypted 
message. Restoration of a pseudorandom character typical for 
an unmodified demand is examined by researchers in [2]. 
An interesting idea is also hiding communication in a DDoS 
attack (Distributed Denial of Service), using DNS 
strengthening [6] (zombie machines generate traffic to a DNS 
server, but due to a replacement of IP addresses, all answers 
reach the victim). Information may be hidden thanks to a 
modification of a Zone file and a TXT-type record in a DNS 
server controlled by the attacker. Other proposed carriers of 
hidden communication include distributions of occurrences of 
domains in queries in a specific period of time, or of types of 
queries. Detection of atypical communication is more difficult 
because an administrator of an attacked network will deal with 
the attack in the first order. What is more, potentially recorded 
“special” packets will account for a tiny fraction of the traffic 
followed.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we will 
describe the fundamentals of DNS service and protocol. In 
section 3 and 4 we will present a steganographic analysis and 
the model of hiding information in DNS messages. Section 5 
will describe a proof of concept, which will be evaluated in 
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper. 
II. DNS SERVICE AND PROTOCOL  
DNS is a name of a service, servers of this service and a 
protocol for exchange of messages between clients and servers 
providing this service. It allows to change mnemonic (easier to 
remember) names of domains to IP addresses (of a network 
layer protocol of the ISO/OSI model). It is one of basic 
services that comprise the operation of the Internet today.  
In order to identify a potential vulnerability of a DNS 
server, an analysis of formats and scenarios of exchange of 
messages between servers and the client has been performed 
[7]. This allowed to identify several potential options to hide 
information.  
A. Format of messages 
The format of DNS messages is constant, irrespective of the 
demand type. A message carrying an answer to a question is 
bigger because it uses more fields than the question. The fields 
for which it has not been specified otherwise are of variable 
length, calculated or determined elsewhere.  
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1)  Header – a classic header, contains basic information  
allowing to send and identify messages.  
2)  Question – stores queries to the name server.  
3)  Answer – stores records of answers to queries.  
4)  Authority – indicates authority servers for a domain.  
5)  Additional – dedicated for additional information. 
B. Format of header field  
A header of a message contains many fields, including fields 
marked collectively as ‘flags’. The most important elements 
for the solution presented in this article include:  
1)  QR (Query/Response Flag) – (one bit) has value ‘0’ for 
queries, it is changed to ‘1’ for answers. 
2)  Opcode (Operation Code) – (4 bits) specifying the query 
type. This is usually 0; not all 4-bit combinations are used. 
3)   QDCount (Question Count) – (2 bytes) specifies the 
number of queries sent in a demand. 
4)   ANCount (Answer Record Count) – (2 bytes) specifies the 
number of answer records. In DNS queries, the ‘0’ value is 
not forced. 
In the description of the QR field, the word “changed” has 
been used on purpose because the packet of answers contains 
the query contents in itself (it extends it by completing or 
modifying the existing fields).  
The count-type fields have a function of an indicator 
informing the program interpreting the packet about the 
amount of records of a given type to be expected. Information 
about the length of every record (where an indicator for its end 
byte is calculated) is inside it. 
C. Format of an answer field  
A question and an answer are formed into structures which 
facilitate their matching. Their fields include: 
1)  Name – contains the name of the object, zone or domain 
which identifies the query.  
2)  Type – (2 bytes) contains the type of record. The most 
popular type is record A, that is a query about the IPv4 
address of the domain specified in the Name field. 
Respectively, AAAA is a query about the IPv6 address. 
3)  Class – (2 bytes) defines a class of a query, and usually has 
value ‘1’ that is IN (Internet). 
4)  TTL (Time To Live) – (2 bytes) specifies at which number 
of demands real queries should be sent to a DNS server, 
instead of using previously downloaded data (from the 
cache memory). 
5)  Resource Data Length – (2 bytes) specifies at what number 
of bytes the current record ends; this field exists to make it 
possible to use a common format for various types of 
record.  
6)  Resource Data – contains data bytes. For instance, for an 
A-type record (a basic query for a DNS), four bytes 
containing an IPv4 address are required.  
D Exchange of messages 
For the needs of the solution presented here, a (largely 
simplified) scheme of communication with a DNS server may 
be depicted as follows: a client wishing to find an IP address of 
a domain, first reaches for the address of the main DNS server 
recorded in the setup of the web interface. Next, it formulates a 
query (for instance about an A-type record) and sends it to the 
address obtained in the previous step. Depending on the type 
of the query and its content, it may be forwarded to other DNS 
servers until the answer finally reaches the client.  
III.  STEGANOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
The theoretical analysis performed has been confirmed with 
tests carried out by sending standard and prepared queries to a 
Google DNS server (IP: 8.8.8.8), and by following them in 
WireShark, a program for network traffic monitoring. The 
following conclusions have been drawn from the analysis:  
1) The DNS server processing the queries ignored distorted 
queries i.e. queries containing header fields completed in a 
non-standard manner. 
2) Rare queries of the reverse query type or with unused 
OPCode distinguish themselves greatly, which adversely 
affects non-detectability of transmission of additional 
information. 
3) DNS queries (messages with a QR flag set up to 0) may 
also have responses; such a query is not treated as 
unprecedented or distorted; in addition, at the arrival of 
such a complex message, it is correctly interpreted by the 
server – a prepared answer is simply replaced with a 
correct one.  
4) In the DNS answer structure, the Resource Data Length 
field informs us how many bytes the Resource Data field 
occupies; this value may, however, be predicted, for 
instance for an answer to the A-type record, this field will 
always occupy 4 bytes, which is as much as needed to 
record the IPv4 address; therefore, in the case of a record of 
this type, the protocol envisages the interpretation of only 
first four bytes from the Resource Data field – the other are 
ignored, in spite of determining their number in the 
Resource Data Length field. 
IV. STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL 
Considering the analysis, among many options the most 
promising seems to be the following model of hiding 
information in DNS messages: 
1) This is a standard (Opcode = 0) query (QR = 0) about one 
domain (QDCount = 1, Query[1]). 
2) Even though it is a query, the packet contains one answer 
(ANCount = 1, Answer[1]); if more than one answer is 
placed, the tests have shown that a real DNS server would 
reject the packets.  
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3) In the query field there is one question about the IPv4 
address (Query[1].Type = 2) of the existing domain (for 
instance: Query[1].Name = kstit2016.iitis.pl). 
4) The Answer[1].TTL field serves to number the sent 
messages. It is able to address 32,768 messages (2 bytes). 
5) In the Answer[1].IP field the correct IPv4 address is 
placed, which would be provided by the DNS server to 
such a query. 
6) After the Answer[1].IP field (where, in line with the 
protocol specification, there should be no data) 
confidential information is placed. 
7) The Answer[1].ResourceDataLength field contains correct 
information on data length (4 bytes to the prepared IPv4 
address + length of confidential data). 
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
A Malware 
The concept explained above was proven right during the 
implementation of malware. It contains a setup file in which 
the following items are defined: 
1)  DnsAddr – A public IPv4 address of a compromised DNS 
server – this is where all DNS queries (even the true ones) 
from an infected computer will go.  
2)  FilePointer – A name or path to a file, which is to be 
secretly sent. 
3)  ChuckSize – Maximum size of a single DNS message – 
when an indicated file exceeds this size, it will be cut into 
pieces; files with a maximum size of  
32768 * ChuckSize are allowed, because this is the 
maximum amount of messages which may be sent within 
one session (one malware launch). 
4)  IpDnsList – Prepared list of pairs (IP address – DNS name) 
serving to prepare queries. In every DNS demand in which 
information is hidden, there is a question about a certain 
domain from this list, and the answer contains the IP 
address of this domain – in this way, the answer resembles 
more the one with an Opcode = 1 code. This is another 
form of a security measure in the case of an analysis of 
DNS queries against suspicious or uncommon parameters, 
such as an IP address occurring too often or a private 
address occurring where a public one should. 
5)  WaitTime – A maximum limit of time which may elapse 
between sending one packet of data and another. 
B From the perspective of the infected computer 
1) A malware process reading start parameters from a setup 
file is launched on an infected computer. 
2) The process replaces the address of a systemic DNS server 
with the one specified as a parameter, previously saving the 
original address. 
3) The process finds the file with the required name and 
divides it into pieces, if necessary, and then begins sending 
it (generating queries with answers, using the IpDnsList 
file). 
4) Sending chunks of data is randomized – before sending a 
consecutive packet, the malware waits for a random time 
from the range from 0 to WaitTime. 
C From the perspective of the compromised server 
1)  A prepared DNS server process is launched. 
2)  It captures all the queries, which reach it and divides them 
into the ones, which contain hidden information and those 
which do not. 
3)   From those with information hidden data are extracted and 
then they are treated like other demands. These packets are 
not filtered out because this could be detected on an 
infected computer – a large number of demands without 
answers would occur.  
4)  Those without hidden data are forwarded to the real DNS 
server (DNS Google with the address: 8.8.8.8) with the 
source address replaced with the address of the 
compromised server; the answers to the demands returning 
to the server taken over are then directed to the infected 
computer; from its perspective it looks as if the 
(compromised) server under query were a real DNS server 
– unnoticeable delays are introduced, and all source and 
target addresses are set up so that they do not betray any 
suspicious activity.  
Thanks to such a realization of a client and server 
application, prepared queries are very difficult to detect. 
Except from the fact that they contain an answer (and 
constantly ANCount is set to 1), they bear no difference from 
other DNS queries sent from the infected computer. Another 
asset is completely correct answers to prepared queries, which 
may also mislead a person attempting to detect suspicious 
traffic. 
D Implementation details 
The malware application has been written on the .NET 
platform in C#, using the Pcap.NET library. Such a choice was 
due to a good integration of the platform with the Windows 
operating systems, which facilitated processing of system calls.  
The DNS server application was written in Java from the 
scratch due to simple network management and multithreading 
support. It managed a large number of queries very well, both 
prepared and standard ones, without introducing any 
noticeable delay. 
The entire testing environment was launched on virtual 
machines, under Windows 7 operating system control, thanks 
to the Hyper-V solution by Microsoft. Despite of a 
virtualization layer, the environment ran very smoothly and it 
allowed to perform the tests mentioned above. 
The tests were conducted inside a local network under 
control of one router. The malware set up the router’s public 
address as the DNS server address on the infected computer. 
The router was set up so that all the DNS queries (UDP 
packets to port 53), which reached it were directed to the 
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address of a substituted server on another machine inside the 
network. Thus, the Internet’s impact on the solution’s 
behaviour was minimized. The exchange of packets is depicted 
in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of DNS message exchange: The infected computer sends 
a query to its DNS (1). The router directs such a query to the address of 
a substituted DNS server (2). The latter forwards the query to the real DNS 
server and waits for an answer (3, 4). The response to the request is returned 
(5, 6) and is directed to the original demand author (7, 8). All the steps 
consider the right replacement of source and target addresses and ports. 
VI. EVALUATION 
The presented solution has been tested with the use of the 
following scenario (repeated 10 times): 
1) A computer user browses the Internet – s/he goes to a 
website which s/he is interested in, makes him/herself 
familiar with the content presented there (and on several 
webpages) and then goes to another website. 
2) In the course of his/her activity, malware process is 
launched, which sends an s-packet (that is a packet 
containing a prepared query) to a compromised server 
every second, on average. 
3) The entire traffic is monitored by WireShark.  
The averaged data from measurement results are presented 
in Table I (averaged for 10 measurements). 
TABLE I  
AVERAGED RESULTS OF MEASUREMENTS 
Parameter Value 
Measurement time 600 s 
Number of all packets 254621 
Number of DNS packets 4838 
Number of s-packets 590 
Share of DNS packets in all packets 1.9 % 
Share of s-packets in all packets 0.23 % 
Share of s-packets in DNS packets 12.2 % 
Volume of data hidden in one s-packet 30 B 
Steganographic bit rate  29.5 B 




Thanks to the research conducted, it was possible to find 
a steganographic method, which, according to the authors, is a 
golden mean in a triangle proposed by Jessica Fridrich [1]: 
1)   It ensures a very good steganographic bit rate – thanks to a 
large number of DNS queries, it is easy to blend into the 
crowd; in addition, it is possible to easily regulate the speed 
of sending information by introducing additional delays. 
2)   It ensures satisfactory undetectability – without advanced 
filters and dedicated software to follow anomalies in the 
network, it is virtually undetectable. 
3)  It ensures satisfactory resistance to modification – without a 
rule which will monitor a particular set of parameters (the 
number of answers vs QR field), packets with data may be 
subject to any modifications which may be applied to 
standard DNS packets at the attempt to detect or prevent 
steganography. 
Furthermore, the unique method is easy to modify to obtain 
a two-direction communication – it is enough to cyclically 
send queries for instructions to the compromised server, which 
will be sending them in answers. 
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